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Professor Morgan is more than gracious to me, his colleague in
legal ethics. He understands, I think, that our little sub-discipline is
an academic youngster - open, as children are, to insight and persua-
sion, willing to listen to almost anybody. I am grateful to him for his
kind reference to my work. Along with other American law teachers,
I am grateful for his leadership, critical thought, scholarly discussion,
and example as one of the American legal profession's principal
teachers of ethics.
My usefulness among commentators on Morgan's Thinking About
Launjers as Counselors, is probably that I write about legal ethics in
reference to the Hebraic theological tradition - with attention to the
ethics of Moses and of Jesus. 2 And so I take the occasion to argue
that the theological perspective is useful in considering the ethics of
legal counseling, and to wonder at and complain about the neglect of
religion by my colleagues in legal ethics as they try to decide how
American lawyers should behave.
*B.A., J.D., LL.D.; Robert and Marion Short Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame;
member of the Indiana Bar.
1. See Morgan, Thinking About Lawyers as Counselors, 42 FLA. L. REV. 439 (1990).
2. These ideas and arguments are developed more fully and documented tediously in my
work in theological legal ethics. See generally T. SHAFFER, AmERICAN LEGAL ETHICS (1985)
(rejecting the idea of a separate professional majority); T. SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFES-
SIONS (1987) (attempting to develop a narrative, Aristotelian approach to legal ethics); T.
Shaffer, Lawyers and their Communities (unpublished manuscript); T. SHAFFER, ON BEING
A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981) (advocating the Judeo-Christian idea of caring for the
client over the professional norms of deferring to the client and being paternalistic to the client
in performing the lawyering function).
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I. How TO BE GOOD
In ethics, even legal ethics, we agree that we want to be good
people, or, at least, we agree that it is interesting to talk about
lawyers being good people. By definition, we are beyond the issue of
why we bother with the question. After the issue of motivation to be
good is resolved or assumed away, the fundamental question for us
is how to tell whether an action, or a disposition, or a life, is good.
I understand Professor Morgan to have decided that a lawyer's action
or disposition is good when it feels right or when it seems to come
naturally. 3 He contrasts his view with that of David Luban, who de-
cides the question by reference to what Luban calls "ordinary moral-
ity,"4 and with the answer (or procedure) of William Simon, who con-
sults "legal values."5 What these four theories of how to tell what is
good have in common is that none of them describes the morals of
American lawyers.6 The feels-right test, the feels-natural test, the
ordinary-morality test, and the legal-values test do not demonstrate
what an anthropologist would notice first of all - the coherent, de-
scribable, cultural contours of the morals they propose to influence.7
The failure to describe is a defect in all four theories. Those who
think and write about legal ethics should be careful to describe lawyers'
morals as fully as they can. Description is necessary first for usefulness
and second for clarity - necessary, that is, to lawyers who might be
open to influence from the scholarship of legal ethics, and also neces-
sary to those who want to understand what the scholars are saying.
I mean to be judgmental, to imitate the fraternal correction of Carl
Van Doren when his brother Mark once showed him a draft of some-
thing Mark had written discussing "values." Carl said to Mark: "'Val-
ues,' Good God, you can't say 'values'! Decide what you mean and
then say that!'8
There is a third particular and fairly ominous reason for my com-
plaint: Abstract ethical discussion in the legal profession has not done
3. Morgan, supra note 1, at 459
4. Id. at 442 n.ll.
5. Id. at 444 n.20.
6. By "morals," I refer to the notions, ideas, and impulses that appear to determine behavior.
For other similar usages, see S. HAUERWAS, VISIONS AND VIRTUE 14-20 (1974) (using the
term "moral notions"); I. MURDOCH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD 15-16 (1970) (moral vision).
7. See, e.g., R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS
OF THE HEART (1985) (examining the relationship between character and society in America);
C. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE (1986) (examining methods of sitting and evading
disputes in a suburban Baptist community).
8. M. VAN DOREN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARK VAN DOREN 99 (1958).
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very well at keeping fatuity at bay. Our professional past - a past
that is not dead, not even past; the long and not-yet-ended era of the
gentleman's ethic in the American legal profession - shows that Amer-
ican lawyers tend to slip into an unfortunate and indefensible ethic of
honor and shame. Abstract legal ethics of the sort Professor Morgan
discusses have not been able to keep them from slipping.
The ethic of honor and shame says that the way to be good is to
seek the approval of professional peers. This is the legal ethic that
made it possible for lawyers in America to countenance, approve of,
defend, and provide the legal frameworks for slavery, imperialism,
exploitation of immigrants and women, yellow-dog contracts, the dep-
redations of the robber barons, and the rape of the earth.9 The ethic
of honor and shame is, as Aristotle says, 10 heuristically fragile; it also
tends to evil consequences. As a matter of logic and of consequences,
honor and shame is an ethic that relies on self-deception. The survival
of such an ethic among lawyers is likely when those who write ethics
for lawyers avoid describing the morals of the lawyers they write for.
A legal ethic that attends to the description of morals avoids this
sort of moral drift; it learns to discipline itself into arguing in terms
of what is going on. (And what has been going on is slavery, im-
perialism, exploitation, etc.) Thus, I suggest that a test for any ethical
account in American legal ethics is whether it provides a corrective
for the ethics of honor and shame. Compliance with such a test is, I
think, the proper business of those who make their living talking in
the university about what American lawyers ought to do. The reason
I relate this moral demand on my colleagues to theology is because
that is where I learned about it."
II. RELIGIOUS ETHICS AS A WAY TO DESCRIBE
WHAT IS GOING ON
What is needed in times of moral drift in a community (or in a
profession, or in a university law school) is a way of seeing, a counter-
reference, a moral perspective that is, in the circumstances, novel -
"an alternative perception of reality.., not simply a defensive mea-
sure, but . . . an act of identity, energy, and power," as Walter
9. See Shaffer, The Uniqhe, Novel and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697,
698-703 (1988).
10. See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 8 (M. Ostwald trans. 1962).
11. See H. NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF: AN ESSAY IN CHRISTIAN MORAL
PHILOSOPHY (1963) (influential statement of a Christian ethic of responsibility for oneself); see
also A. JONSEN, RESPONSIBILITY IN MODERN RELIGIOUS ETHICS (1968) (a theological ethic
of responsibility).
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Brueggemann puts it. 12 "[S]uch specificity ... exercises an important
critical function to show that the large claims of the dominant reality
cannot be taken at face value." 13
Attention to the possibility of a counter-reference in ethics may
seem to assume a description of reality to which the counter-reference
can refer. That is, one who proposes to use Brueggemann's "alternative
perception" first has to take into account the "dominant" way to de-
scribe reality. In fact, though, in Hebraic theology (which is, when it
comes to moral perception, the theology of the Hebrew prophets), the
counter-reference is what makes any description of reality possible;
it is an alternative perception, but it is not another way to see. There
is only one way to see, and the alternative (prophetic) perception is
it. The "dominant" way to see is no kind of perception; it is delusion.
The alternative, in Hebraic religion, points always away from delusion
and toward things as they are. The ethic of honor and shame is the
sort of delusion from which prophetic perception points away.
To say, as I do, that those who work in American legal ethics
evade the task of describing lawyer's morals is to say that they fail
to point away from delusions that support fatuous moral theories such
as the ethics of honor and shame. My colleagues are not telling us
how to see and how to say what is going on. I don't argue that my
colleagues in legal ethics point to delusion and self-deception; I argue
that they do not point to reality at all. They brilliantly attend to
analysis of the abstract.; but they do not, along the way to analysis,
describe the morals they apparently want to shape with their ethics.
(If they do not want to shape morals, why are they bothering with
ethics?) Their ethical theory does not seem to need perception. I am
also, of course, arguing that this is a theoretical deficiency. (If I do
not want to make theoretical arguments, why am I bothering with
ethics?) In both senses, this argument of mine is itself a moral argu-
ment: My sisters and brothers in this child-like sub-discipline of ours
should do more to stern fatuity in the moral reasoning of American
lawyers.
Why don't our colleagues describe the morals of lawyers? I believe
it is because they are (for the most part) law professors who do not
like to think, write, or talk about religion. At any rate, they do not
appear to like to talk about the sort of religion that has to be taken
12. Brueggemann, II Kings 18-19: The Legitimacy of a Sectarian Hermeneutic, 7 HORIZONS
IN BIBLICAL THEOLOGY 1 (1985). All of the quotations and references to Brueggemann herein




seriously. There is some discussion of religion in law school and in
continuing legal education, but most of it occurs when those who talk
about it are dealing with the law of church and state. In those discus-
sions, religion in America is treated as a nineteenth-century intruder
on the American secular enterprise - as if the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and Thomas Jefferson's vision of a republic in North America
occurred before the Conquistadores came to the Southwest, ,or the
Jesuits to Canada, or the Pilgrims to Plymouth Rock.
This is odd, almost inexplicable, when you consider that legal
academics come from, and teach and write in and for, a nation that
is perennially attentive to its Hebraic religious heritage: ninety percent
of Americans say they believe in God (and my guess is that most of
those who say this mean the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob).
Seventy percent claim affiliation with organized religion (Jewish or
Christian for the most part). More than half say they regularly attend
organized religious services. 14 For some reason my colleagues in legal
ethics, like my colleagues in the rest of legal education (but not like
my colleagues in other respectable parts of the university), find it
plausible to ignore, or at least not to describe, the prosaic contours
of the morals of those on whom the law is imposed, and of those who
practice law, and of those who decide cases in the courts.
In a way this situation is a compliment to the honesty of law
teachers: you cannot truthfully describe morals in America if you leave
religion out of the description; my colleagues are not comfortable talk-
ing about religion, but they do try to be truthful when they talk; and
therefore....
III. RELIGIOUS ETHICS AS CORRECTIVE
Scholarly discipline is not the reason I take this occasion to attempt
to correct a deficiency in legal ethics. I climbed into my religious niche
in legal ethics for more personal reasons. My interest in a theological
ethic for the law office is "confessional." I did not get into this way
of writing in an attempt to provide what my colleagues evade, although
that aspect of my choice sometimes makes what I do defensible to my
academic superiors. I describe religious ethics in legal ethics because
I am a believer who accepts it as part of being grateful to the Lord
to acknowledge my faith, even in law school. That reason is "scholarly"
enough, I suppose: the world, including law school, is, as John Calvin
said, a theatre for the glory of God. 15 I suppose it is consistent with
14. THE GALLUP REPORT (Report No. 259, Apr. 1987).
15. J. CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 72, 179, 341 (F. Battles trans.
1960) (originally published in 1536).
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a confessional purpose to say that it is intellectually important for
lawyers to know where they come from and where they are headed.
It helps keep them honest about their influence on students. But that,
too, for me, is incidental. I did not come to religious legal ethics
through scholarship; with me it's the other way around.
In my case, as in the case of others who share my occupation and
my faith (and who tell me about it), a confessional person may need
to decide a couple of consequent theological issues. He may need to
decide, for example, whether he is interested in ecumenism, or in
attempts to formulate among lawyers a consensus expression of ethical
principles. My preference, as "theological ethicist," in a law school, in
the post-ABA-Model-Rules world, is descriptive. I prefer seeking to
learn what the morals of American lawyers are and where they come
from. I think it is better for legal ethics, just now, to dig in and find
out, rather than to attempt to resolve. What American legal ethics
needs, in other words, is to develop an anthropology for itself.
Most ecumenism is sappy; I would rather see if I can find a clear,
uncompromising, and unmediated statement of the implications of
halachah16 in a Jewish lawyer's life with her clients than work on a
proposal for a "Judeo-Christian" solution to the "problem" of keeping
client confidences. My truculent sentiment extends to attempts at
"nonsectarian" consensus statements of moral principle; it has been
my melancholy experience that consensus statements by American
lawyers compromise or avoid most of what is ethically important. 17
Consider, as an example of why religious legal ethics might be
better off digging in and finding out, the American lawyer's drift into
the ethics of the gentleman. I return to this example because I think
it is historically and circumstantially central to our work - historically
in that gentleman's ethics was and still is the most attractive and
powerful force in the morals of lawyers in America, circumstantially
in that currently popular accounts of gentleman's ethics, as the Amer-
ican Bar Association's campaign for professionalism demonstrates,18
grow ever more incoherent.
16. "Halachah" (halakah) means law, but it is law in a system that makes no clear distinction
between law and morals. W. HERBERG, JUDAISM AND MODERN MAN: AN INTERPRETATION
OF JEWISH RELIGION 292 (1951).
17. See Shaffer & Rodes, A Christian Theology for Roman Catholic Law Schools, 14 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 5, 15-16 (1988).
18. Report on the Commission on Professionalism to the Board of Directors and the House
of Delegates of the American Bar Association, 112 FED. RULES DECISIONS 243 (1986); Stanley,
Professionalism and Commercialism, 50 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1989).
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The principal reason these accounts are both so durable and so
unclear is that they avoid the description of morals; and the principal
reason they get away with avoiding the description of morals is that
they get away with disdaining the theological clues. Theology is evi-
dent in our cultural history, in the history of the church in America,
and in nineteenth-century statements of legal ethics from David
Hoffman (1817) 19 to Thomas Goode Jones (1885).20 These theological
clues, when they are noticed in other disciplines and in our own pro-
fessional history, say that the morals of the gentleman-lawyer come
from the Anglo American Protestant church (what Anthony Trollope's
mother once called the American state religion).21 The most powerful
ethical force among American lawyers, in other words, is a theology.
It is equally evident to me that the ethical error the gentleman-
lawyer made in America was a theological error - an error the theolo-
gians of the Reformation would have pointed out, had they been con-
sulted, an error that was in fact pointed out by John Henry Newman,
a scholarly gentleman who was also the English Church's most eminent
convert to Roman Catholicism: The theological error was a failure to
come to terms with how the Children of Israel and the Children of
the Gospel learn to overcome evil in the world.2 The gentleman has
not been willing to contemplate, let alone to follow, the Cross and the
Suffering Servant of Israel. Christian gentlemen have been unwilling
to act morally when it appears to them that others will suffer if they
do, and that has made them, in Philip Mason's phrase, merely a sub-
cult of the English Protestant Christianity which is their heritage.23
Those who have formed the gentleman's ethic into an ethic of honor
and shame have hidden both from the gentleman's strength as a be-
liever and from his difficulty as a believer who deceives himself. They
have wanted a theology without pain. They have sought a professional
world in which no one gets hurt, and thus they have sought, in Cardinal
Newman's phrase, to quarry granite with a razor and to moor their
19. D. HOFFMIAN, Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, in A COURSE OF
LEGAL STUDY 752 (2d ed. 1836) (originally published in 1817).
20. See Code of Ethics, 118 Ala. xxiii (1899). Chief Judge Jones wrote this code and contrib-
uted to its modifications, which became the 1908 version of the ABA Canons of Legal Ethics.
Armstrong, A Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063 (1978).
21. Cf. F. TROLLOPE, DOMESTIC MANNERS OF THE AMERICANS 89-95 (1832) (P. Smith
ed. 1974) (describing American religious establishments).
22. See P. MASON, THE ENGLISH GENTLEMAN: THE RISE AND FALL OF AN IDEAL
182-83 (1982) (quoting John Henry Newman); T. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR
COAMUNITIES chs. 1-5 (galley proofs 1991) (unpublished manuscript).
23. P. MASON, supra note 22, at 181 (discussing Newman's theories and explaining how
the English regarded the "gentleman" as a focus for their moral code).
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vessel with a thread of silk.? Which means, of course, that their ethic
has needed to cherish calculations of honor and shame, rather than
an account of what is going on, in order to survive.
IV. WHO'S LISTENING?
The elementary ethical task of describing the morals of the gen-
tleman-lawyer in America illustrates a specific, scholarly, academic,
professional, and pervasive reason for digging into the theological. It
gives the digger a motive, and, I suppose, it gives the digger an
excuse for complaining, as I do, that others are not also digging. But
it does not provide a reason for people to listen to the digger or to
look at what he digs up, which is to say that if the listeners are as
wed to the gentleman's ethic as the gentleman is, digging up its the-
ological error may be at best futile and at worst self-indulgent. And
that is to say that one explanation for why legal ethics ignores theology
is that lawyers, law students, and judges are not interested in what
theology has to offer.
Perhaps lawyers and judges who read law reviews, and students
in law school, want to know why they should listen to a troublesome,
divisive, uncomfortable theological legal ethic; I have listened to them
wonder. It may be the case - I suspect many teachers of legal ethics
think it is - that our audience is as little inclined to listen as the
scholars are to dig.
One answer for me to give to these suppositious listeners is that
many of them are already listening; people find theological questions
interesting, once they get used to them. We teachers can learn from
the disciplines of theology and religious studies - disciplines that
even today, in an America which university professors call post-Chris-
tian, sustain thousands of exacting, demanding scholars. If almost all
of our listeners believe in God, and two-thirds of them belong to a
religious denomination, and half of them go to services regularly, it
probably seems unusual to our listeners that we talk about morals
and ignore religion. I have listened to them wonder about that, too.
Another answer for listeners is the possibility that a theological
legal ethic would affect them in a deeper and more satisfying way
than abstract, analytical, "philosophical" explanations have - which
is another way to say that it is useful to notice that ethics did not
begin with the Enlightenment's rejection of religious authority. Who,
24. Id. at 186-87.
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after all, contemplates her life with her clients when she reads John
Rawls?25
Our morals run deeper than our democratic-liberal jurisprudence
does: Our morals are earthier and more physical; they have to do with
feeling and experience and what we bring to the profession from
family, neighborhood, and town. We teachers of ethics may call such
observations "positions," once we figure out that we can make a living
by talking about them, but we know in our hearts that a serious
ethical argument among American lawyers comes from our cultural,
traditional, and theological roots. "There are no raw events[,]" as
Walter Brueggemann puts it. "There are only events shaped and dis-
cerned through a community of perception." Such communities of
perception in our culture have been religious communities, and reli-
gious communities remember (even when they betray the memory)
that they know how to see and how to say what is going on.
Here is a positive example of the use of theological argument, in
public, on moral questions like those we take up in legal ethics: recent
pastoral statements from organized American religious groups on is-
sues of homelessness, pollution, the capitalist economy, and the federal
government's manufacturing, storing, and threatening to use nuclear
weapons.Y' These pastoral statements have been sectarian arguments,
made in diverse (or as we often say, "pluralistic") communities, made
both in the "marketplace of ideas" and in communities of believers.
They are doubtless among the oldest forms of "republican" argument
in America. (By "republican," I mean that they depend on a social
order in which groups other than the government have influence both
on thought and on uses of power.) They stand in a tradition of pastoral
statements that reaches back to the pulpits of the Massachusetts Bay
Colony in the East and the Franciscan missions in the West, through
the synagogues of eighteenth-century American Jewry and the revival
preachers of the nineteenth century, to the twentieth-century Social
Gospel and modern Roman Catholic doctrines on social justice. Their
substance, their inspiration, and their style are rooted in persistent,
faithful reading of the Hebrew Prophets.
25. John Rawls is currently a member of the Department of Philosophy at Harvard Univer-
sity. He is the author of A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 114 CONTEMPORARY AUTHORS 377
(1985).
26. Brueggeman, supra note 12, at 32-33.
27. See generally H. BECKLEY, JUSTICE IN AMERICAN THEOLOGICAL ETHICS
(Westminster galley proofs 1991) (unpublished manuscript); Beckley, Love, Human Dignity,
and Justice: Some Legacies from Protestant and Catholic Ethics, _ NOTRE DAME L. REV.
(1991); Beckley, The Legacy of John A. Byan's Theory of Justice, 33 Am. J. JURIS. 61 (1988).
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If nothing else, this old tradition of pastoral statements in America
demonstrates that the civic community - what politicians and televi-
sion reporters refer to now as "the American people" - is interested
in religious argument. Only law professors fail to understand that.
V. RELIGIOUS ETHICS AS THE TRUTH
Another reason to dig out, describe, and observe the religious roots
of legal counselors' morals is that the theological account might be the
truth. That reason has two sides to it. On one side the theologically
persuaded person exhibits her confidence in religious truth so that
the community can see her do it. In traditional religious terms she
bears witness to her faith. Her statement to the community is not
universal in a Kantian or Rawlsian sense,2 but it is universal nonethe-
less because she makes it to everyone, for everyone, confident that
everyone would be better off to find it truthful, as she does. It has
always been important to Jews and Christians to be candid about their
faith in this way, and to seek to interest others in its truthfulness.
In this sense, the faithful learn to think of themselves as a priestly
people: "I will make of thee a great nation, and I will bless thee, and
make thy name great; and . . . in thee shall all the families of the
earth be blessed."-
The other side of the theological-truth reason has to do with the
purity and soundness of theological argument. It is why many of those
who are serious about theological ethics are wary of professional con-
sensus statements on morals: The community of faith is suspicious of
all conventional wisdom and attends to its own theological integrity,
as it bears witness, tells its stories, and is faithful to its memory,
because unless it does it will not have anything to say. The faithful
remember this lesson in stark, painful images: Joshua's God in combat
with pagan gods;30 Jesus letting the rich young man walk away;31
Oliver Cromwell, in Carlyle's image, prostrating himself in the dust
before his God and setting his foot on the neck of his king.3 2 Integrity
means that the faithful remember their prophets, their martyrs, and
their most powerful preachers.
28. "Universal," that is, in the sense that the indicated morality would apply to any person,
regardless of culture. See I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 56 (L.
White Beck trans. 1969) (originally published in 1785).
29. Genesis 12:2-3.
30. See generally Joshua 24:15 (describing the crossing of the Israelites into the promised
land).
31. Mark 10:17.




Theological integrity requires a stubbornness that can be mistaken
for aloofness, or even for pietism, but is instead a matter of faithful-
ness: "When the singular holiness of God is assigned to historical
structures, it has become self-serving ideology[,]" Brueggemann says.*
It has become a civic and bogus religious reason for serving the in-
terests, whatever they are, of the state, of the prosperous and pow-
erful, or of the fraternity of professional gentlemen.
"The primal conversation in the Old Testament is behind the wall,"
Brueggemann says, "and it is not different in the New Testament. It
is a tradition of suspicion against the dominant rationality .... [T]his
posture of suspicion is the source of vitality and passion, and I dare
say of compassion and humaneness."m Suspicion preserves the "secta-
rian" conversation behind the wall. This does not mean that "outsiders"
are excluded so much as that compromise with the dominant rationality
has to be limited by truthfulness, by the alternative perception that
gives ethics coherence and force. Compromise destroys vitality when
compromise is the result of coming to terms with power, rather than
coming to terms with another person's perception of the way things
are.
The vitality and passion that are protected by this sectarian suspi-
cion are the sources of compassion because love is not enough. (Feeling
right and doing what comes naturally, and helping a friend are not
enough. In fact, granite is not quarried with a razor, nor are vessels
moored with silk.) A coherent and forceful ethic of love does not rest
on physical urges or on a neurological surge of fellow feeling; we learn
to love, as much as we learn to speak a language. We learn to love
- and we learn what love is - in a tradition, in the memory of a
community, in the conversation behind the wall. A coherent and force-
ful ethic of love has to be suspicious because it has to protect the
place where we learn what love is like.
Brueggemann's biblical image is Assyria's siege of Jerusalem,# and
the two conversations it provoked - one with the invading army, on
the wall,3 and one among the besieged faithful, behind the wall.37 In
much of his recent work on what Christians call the Old Testament,
Brueggemann devotes energy and eloquence to the contrast between
the "sectarian" conversation behind the wall (the conversation about
33. Brueggeman, supra note 12, at 15.
34. Id. at 29.
35. This siege is described in 2 Kings 18, 19.
36. Brueggman, upm note 12, at 4-5.
37. Id. at 5-6.
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what a faithful people ought to be) and the secular conversation on
the wall, the conversation with the "empire."
The conversation on the wall is what today we would likely call
the civic conversation. It is a dialogue in which sectarians make their
arguments for what the community (or the professional fraternity)
ought to do. The conversation in which the faithful speak on the wall
is the tradition the Bible tells about as prophetic. Brueggemann speaks
of it as a tradition of "pain brought to speech."3 9 This description
recalls Newman's complaint that the English gentleman turned away
from the way their religious tradition taught them to come to terms
with evil in the world.40
The "empire" of which Brueggemann speaks has learned not to
pay attention to its victims: "The empire ... does not mind oppressed
people being hurt," Brueggemann says, "so long as there is no public
outcry' 41 - that is, so long as the dominant rationality keeps the
empire and its professional fraternities from noticing those who are
being hurt. The empire's discomfort (and either its use of force to
attempt to silence the outcry or its momentary attentiveness to the
outcry as a counter-reference for moral perception) comes when the
sectarians speak out, with "a cry of pain that destabilizes, assaults
and delegitimates every absolute imperial claim.
' '42
In order to be able to speak out in that way, the sectarians have
to be careful - and often they fail to be careful - that the empire
does not become their sect; if they let the empire become the sect (as
Christians in America have usually done), they will lose their ability
to be discontented as well as the more subtle gift they may from time
to time be given to speak out for the discontented.
The sectarians of 'Hebrew Scripture preserve their ability to
criticize themselves (and thereby their ability to criticize the empire),
when they do (which is not often), by remembering where they come
from, and how they came (out of slavery in Egypt, by the power of
God, through the suffering of the Servant, on the Cross), and by
remembering the style, the energy, and the courage of the prophets.
They preserve their power to cry out as they remember their unfaith-
fulness and repentance. Unless they attend to their theology, to what
Dietrich Bonhoeffer called the memory of the church,43 they will not
have anything to say.
38. See generally id.
39. Id. at 18.
40. See P. MASON, supra note 22, at 184 (quoting John Henry, Cardinal Newman).
41. Brueggman, supra note 12, at 18.
42. Id.
43. C. FANT, BONHOEFFER: WORDLY PREACHING 27 (1975).
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